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Abstract
On 25 March 2011, the European Council adopted a decision aiming at the amendment of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the addition of a new paragraph to Article 136 
of that Treaty. The additional paragraph, consisting of two short sentences, runs as follows:
“The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated 
if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required 
financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.”
This is the first use made of one of the two ‘simplified’ Treaty revision procedures which were cre-
ated by the Lisbon Treaty. In this paper, the Lisbon reform of the Treaty revision procedures will 
first be described in general terms. Two other initiatives for post-Lisbon treaty revision will then be 
mentioned; both relate to the composition of the European Parliament and do not involve the use of 
the simplified revision procedure. The paper will then explain the reasons why the European Coun-
cil considered it necessary to amend the TFEU in order to contribute to the smooth functioning of 
the Economic and Monetary Union. Finally, there will be a discussion of the various steps taken so 
far in this amendment process which is scheduled to be finished by January 2013, after approval of 
the amendment from the side of each of the 27 EU states.
Introduction
On 25 March 2011, the European Council adopted a 
decision aiming at the amendment of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union by the addition 
of a new paragraph to Article 136 of that Treaty. The 
additional paragraph, consisting of two short sentences, 
runs as follows:
“3. The Member States whose currency is the euro 
may establish a stability mechanism to be activated 
if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro 
area as a whole. The granting of any required financial 
assistance under the mechanism will be made subject 
to strict conditionality.”1
Further steps at the European level are not required, but 
the amendment will enter into force only if approved 
by the 27 member states of the EU according to their 
own constitutional requirements and procedures. The 
European Council, in Article 2 of its decision of 25 
March, indicates that it shall enter into force on 1 
January 2013, provided that all the national approval 
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procedures have successfully been accomplished by 
that time. This amendment constitutes the first use of 
one of the two so-called simplified revision procedures 
that were introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It is part of 
the complex package of legal rules that was put in place 
by the European Union and by its member states in 
response to the financial stability crisis that erupted in 
the spring of 2010 in Greece and threatened to engulf 
the whole euro area and the other EU countries as well. 
In this paper, the main emphasis will be on situating 
this European Council decision within the context of 
the European Union’s evolving Treaty revision regime, 
whereas the legal and policy framework of Economic 
and Monetary Union will be discussed only to the extent 
necessary for explaining why a Treaty amendment was 
considered necessary - so soon after the last general 
revision treaty revision, namely the Treaty of Lisbon, 
had entered into force. 2 
The legal context: the post-Lisbon regime of 
treaty revision
The Lisbon Treaty was the latest link in the long 
chain of revisions of the founding Treaties of the 
European Union. It did not seek to break that chain 
and the Lisbon Treaty was carefully presented by its 
authors – the member states of the Union – as ‘just’ 
another amendment of the existing treaties, which was 
accomplished according to the existing rules of change 
that had remained basically the same ever since the 
1950s. Yet, this last revision process took much longer 
than any of the previous ones – eight full years since 
it was launched at the Laeken European Council in 
December 2001 – and the member state governments 
showed signs of relief mixed with undeniable 
‘institutional reform fatigue’ when, on 1 December 
2009, ‘their’ revision treaty finally entered into force. 
They all seemed to agree that the epoch of major treaty 
revisions was over now, at least during the political 
lifetime of this generation of European leaders. 
However, nobody wanted to exclude the possibility of 
making some piecemeal treaty amendments in the years 
to come. Indeed, the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty (and, 
earlier on, of the Constitutional Treaty) had clearly 
envisaged this possibility by introducing changes in the 
revision procedures whose aim was to create simpler 
ways of modifying some parts of the Treaties in the 
future. 3  
The idea of creating a more flexible regime of treaty 
revision had often been discussed in the past. In 
1999, a ‘Group of Wise Men’ chaired by the former 
Belgian prime minister Dehaene, had been called by 
the Commission to shed their light on the upcoming 
post-Amsterdam IGC, and among other things they 
suggested to consider splitting up the European Treaties 
in a ‘fundamental’ and a ‘less fundamental’ part, and to 
possibly combine this distinction with a differentiation 
in the Treaty amendment procedure: the fundamental 
provisions would continue to be revised according to 
the rigid and cumbersome procedure of Article 48 EU 
Treaty, whereas the more technical provisions would 
be amendable according to a more flexible and less 
time-consuming procedure.4 On a further request by the 
Commission, the Robert Schuman Centre at the European 
University Institute then examined the question in greater 
technical detail. It submitted two separate, though related, 
reports in the year 2000: one on reorganisation of the 
treaties, and one on the reform of the treaty amendment 
procedures which proposed rather radical changes in treaty 
revision, including the abolition of the single country 
veto5. Later on, the Franco-German Declaration of Nantes 
of November 2001 proposed the idea of ‘une division des 
traités en une partie constitutionnelle et une partie infra-
constitutionnelle plus facile à faire évoluer.’ One month 
later, the issue was officially put on the Union reform 
agenda in the form of a few among the many questions 
contained in the Laeken Declaration, namely whether the 
existing Treaties should be merged, whether this merged 
document should then be split into a basic treaty and a rest 
treaty, and whether there should be a ‘distinction between 
the amendment and ratification procedures for the basic 
treaty and for the other treaty provisions’.
2  On the broader economic policy issues, see for example N. Jabko, Which Economic Governance for the European Union? Facing up 
to the Problem of Divided Sovereignty, SIEPS Report 2011, no. 2; and The Future of Economic Governance in the EU, House of Lords 
European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2010-11, March 2011.
3   See also, on the new revision procedures after Lisbon, Peadar ó Broin, How to Change the EU Treaties – An Overview of Revision Pro-
cedures under the Treaty of Lisbon, CEPS Policy Brief No. 215, October 2010
4   Von Weizsäcker, Dehaene and Simon, The Institutional Implications of Enlargement, 18 October 1999, at 12-13..
5  The report proposed to replace the consensus rule by some kind of super-qualified majority decision rule for amending the Treaties, 
combined with the possibility for reluctant member states to opt out from the non-institutional amendments (EUI, Robert Schuman 
Centre, Reforming the Treaties’ Amendment Procedures. Second Report on Reorganization of the European Union Treaties, July 2000).
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When the Treaty reform process came to an end, eight 
years after the Laeken Declaration, the idea of making 
a clear subdivision between a ‘basic treaty’ and a ‘rest 
treaty’ had been abandoned, although traces of that 
idea can be found in the fact that the Lisbon Treaty 
(following the Constitutional Treaty on this point) 
introduced a distinction between an ‘ordinary’ rigid 
treaty revision procedure and two separate ‘simplified’ 
revision procedures. The latter happen to apply mainly 
to the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, which – to some extent at least – can be 
considered as the ‘less fundamental’ of the two founding 
Treaties, even though its legal value is the same.
The Lisbon Treaty thus alters the Union’s ‘rules of 
change’ for the future. This ‘revision of the revision’ 
denotes the will of the governments to differentiate the 
rules on treaty amendment so as to make them more 
flexible in some circumstances. The new Article 48 
TEU does not remotely look like the old Article 48 
TEU; its text is much longer and it introduces some 
new modes of amending the Treaties.
Paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 48 TEU (as amended by the 
Lisbon Treaty)6 are entitled Ordinary revision procedure. 
The word ‘ordinary’ does not signify that this procedure 
will be the one that is most commonly used, but rather 
that it is the default procedure which must be used when 
the conditions for using the simplified procedures are 
not met. The ordinary procedure largely corresponds to 
the previously existing treaty revision rules contained in 
Article 48 EU Treaty (pre-Lisbon version) which were used 
in all the previous reform rounds, but with two significant 
additions: the European Parliament is included among the 
actors that may initiate a treaty revision process (although 
subject to the approval by the European Council acting by 
simple majority), and the Convention method is integrated 
as a normal feature for future revisions. However, it is 
clearly confirmed that the Convention will not affect the 
formal power of treaty conclusion that will be entrusted, 
as before, to an intergovernmental conference, and will 
be followed, as before, by ratifications of each state 
separately. It is made possible for the European Council 
to propose that revisions should be decided directly by 
an IGC without a prior Convention, if the nature of the 
revision does not justify the setting-up of a cumbersome 
Convention. The European Council can decide such a 
change of track by a simple majority but subject to the 
consent of the European Parliament, which is of course 
an effective means of ensuring that the European Council 
will not abuse this possibility of acting ‘quickly’, without 
calling a Convention.
Article 48 TEU now also provides for alternatives to 
the mainstream revision procedure. Those alternatives 
are listed and described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of 
Article 48 TEU under the heading ‘simplified revision 
procedures’, which – as we will see – is perhaps an 
unduly optimistic way of presenting them. 
The two simplified revision procedures are to be used 
for two separate purposes. The procedure of paragraph 
7 is to be used for building the so-called passerelles, 
that is, for allowing a passage from unanimous to 
qualified majority voting by the Council in a given area 
or a given case, and a passage from a special to the 
ordinary legislative procedure in a given area or case. 
Thus, a further deepening of integration will be possible 
without calling an IGC and a Convention, but simply by 
means of a unanimous decision of the European Council 
adopted with the consent of the European Parliament. 
There is no need for formal ratification of the amending 
decision by all the member states separately, but each 
national parliament will be able to stop any such 
amendment by expressing its opposition within a six-
month period following the European Council decision 
(that decision will, obviously, not enter into force during 
this period). In this simplified revision procedure, the 
two-step approach is thus not entirely abandoned. The 
difference with the ordinary revision mechanism is that 
national parliaments, instead of being required to give 
their positive approval to proposed amendments, will 
have the option of expressing their negative opinion by 
vetoing a proposed amendment. The original version of 
this mechanism, as submitted by the Italian Presidency 
during the 2003 IGC, provided that a revision decision 
could be stopped if ‘X’ national parliaments expressed 
their opposition, whereby ‘X’ stood for an unspecified 
number higher than one. However, the single parliament 
veto appeared in an IGC document of 5 December 2003 
and remained there until the end of the negotiations 
of the Constitutional Treaty. It was put there on the 
insistence, above all, of the British government. 
6  Note that article 48 TEU is one of the very few Treaty articles that kept the same number as in the pre-Lisbon version.
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The second simplified revision procedure introduced 
by the Treaty of Lisbon, that of Article 48 paragraph 6, 
has a broader scope. It is applicable to all amendments 
of ‘Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union relating to the internal policies and 
action of the Union’, which means all together some 
171 treaty articles – but subject to one major exception: 
if the proposed amendment of an internal policy 
provision leads to an increase in the European Union’s 
competences, then the ordinary revision procedure will 
have to be used instead. So, for example, if the member 
states wanted to modify Article 153 (5) TFEU and 
remove the sentence which currently excludes the use 
of the Union’s social policy competences with regard 
to the right of association and the right to strike, they 
could not do so according to the simplified procedure, 
because that amendment would involve an indirect 
increase of EU competences. It might not always be 
clear, though, whether a proposed amendment will 
increase the Union’s competences, so there might be 
some contestation in the future on whether the use of 
this procedure is appropriate. 
Upon a closer examination of the procedure prescribed 
by paragraph 6, it soon appears that this is not really 
a simplified procedure at all. As in the paragraph 7 
procedure, discussed above, there will be no need for 
a Convention or an IGC; the amendment will rather be 
adopted directly by the European Council acting by 
unanimity of its members. But - and here is the crucial 
difference with paragraph 7 - that decision will be 
subject to ‘approval’ by each member state under its 
own constitutional requirements. One may expect these 
constitutional requirements to involve, in most if not all 
member states, a consultation of the national parliament 
and probably also a positive vote of approval by the 
parliament, and nothing prevents the states from also 
calling a referendum on the proposed treaty change. If, 
furthermore, one considers that adopting a unanimous 
European Council decision is not necessarily a simpler 
feat than reaching an agreement at an IGC (the actors 
being essentially the same…),7 one may well wonder 
whether the paragraph 6 procedure is really any simpler 
than the ordinary revision procedure. 
Two other post-Lisbon treaty amendment 
projects 
Before considering in more detail the European 
Council’s amendment decision of 25 March 2011, we 
should briefly mention two other initiatives for Treaty 
revision that are currently under way, since they help 
to cast doubt on the prediction that, after the difficult 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the text of the 
Treaties would be left untouched for a long time. 
The first of those initiatives aims at modifying the 
composition of the European Parliament by adding 18 
additional members. The last elections to the European 
Parliament took place in June 2009 according to the 
Nice Treaty rules on the composition of the Parliament. 
Since the Lisbon Treaty had not yet entered into force 
in June 2009, the new rules on the composition of the 
EP which were agreed as part of the Final Act of the 
Lisbon IGC could not yet be applied. This was resented 
by those countries that would have had more MEPs 
according to the Lisbon-based rules and particularly 
by Spain that ‘lacked’ four seats in the Parliament that 
was elected in 2009. Under the impulse of the Spanish 
Presidency of the Council during the first semester of 
2010, all the member state governments agreed not to 
wait for the next elections of 2014, which will be held 
according to the Lisbon-based rules, but to correct this 
‘intolerable’ situation immediately.8 They decided to 
temporarily add 18 seats, to be distributed over 12 EU 
states in accordance with the Lisbon-based composition, 
and without yet taking away any of the three seats which 
Germany will lose in 2014 when the ‘real’ Lisbon-based 
composition will kick in. The treaty amendment, which 
was in fact an amendment of a Protocol attached to the 
Treaties,9 was signed on 23 June 2010 after a mini-IGC 
that took just a few days, and after the European Parliament 
had consented to use the ‘light version’ of the ordinary 
7  The fact that an Intergovernmental Conference can act as rapidly as the European Council if there are no serious divergences between 
the EU countries is illustrated by the first post-Lisbon Treaty amendment, mentioned below, which took only six days between the con-
vening of the IGC and the signature of the amendment.
8   See the second recital of the amending Protocol which is very candid about the reasons for treaty amendment: ‘to allow those Member 
States whose number of members of the European Parliament would have been higher if the Treaty of Lisbon had been in force at the 
time of the European Parliament elections in June 2009 to be given the appropriate number of additional seats and to fill them.’
9  Protocol amending the Protocol on Transitional Provisions annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, signed on 23 June 2010, OJ 2010, C 
263/1.
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revision procedure, that is, without a Convention.10 The 
treaty amendment must now be ratified by all the 27 
member states. At the end of March 2011, only eight 
ratifications were missing, and the governments hope that 
the 18 new MPs will be able to enter the Parliament after 
the summer of 2011.11 
A further initiative for treaty revision may soon emerge 
which also relates to the composition of the European 
Parliament. In a report prepared for the Constitutional 
Affairs Committee of the EP, rapporteur Andrew Duff 
proposed a number of amendments to the Act on the 
Elections to the European Parliament but also proposes 
the election of 25 additional members of the EP from a 
single Europe-wide constituency.12 For the latter purpose, 
an amendment of Article 14 TEU is needed since that 
article, in its current version, seems to imply that MEPs 
are elected on a state-by-state basis and, anyway, limits 
their total number to 751. The Constitutional Affairs 
Committee approved the proposal at its April 2011 
meeting, and the EP as a whole will consider it at its 
July session. This could then be the basis for a formal 
initiative by the European Parliament to start the 
ordinary revision procedure. The formal right to launch 
a treaty revision process is indeed granted to the EP by 
the new post-Lisbon text of Article 48(2) TEU.   
The legal reasons for the financial stability 
amendment
The treaty amendment relating to the financial stability 
mechanism is of a very different political and legal 
nature. It originated against the complex background 
of the measures taken, since the spring of 2010, to 
deal with the sovereign debt crisis that first emerged 
in Greece, later spread to Ireland and Portugal and 
generally affected the entire euro area. The treaty 
amendment itself13 was adopted by the European 
Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011, as part of 
a comprehensive package of measures to ensure long-
term budgetary stability of the euro area, including in 
particular the Euro Plus Pact on stronger economic policy 
coordination agreed by the euro area heads of government 
together with those of six non-euro countries.14 
The European stability mechanism (ESM) envisaged by 
the treaty amendment is intended to replace in 2013 the 
currently existing and curious mix of legal instruments 
that were adopted to deal with the sovereign debt crisis 
and which used the various legal toolboxes of public 
international law, European Union law and private law. 
We will now sketch the bare bones of that current regime 
of anti-crisis measures which have raised a number of 
unprecedented issues of legal interpretation.15 
In early May 2010, the euro area countries (except 
Greece) concluded an Agreement with Greece to 
coordinate a series of bilateral loans to that country. 
The European Union was not formally involved 
in the agreement except that the Commission was 
charged by the euro countries to coordinate the 
lending operation. Immediately afterwards, the 
Council adopted a Regulation establishing a European 
financial stabilization mechanism (EFSM) based on 
Article 122(2) TFEU, which could be used in future 
situations similar to that of Greece.16 Article 122(5), 
whose text dates from the Maastricht Treaty, allows 
the Union to grant financial assistance to a Member 
State that ‘is in difficulties or seriously threatened 
with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences beyond its control.’ At the 
10  The mini-IGC that adopted this amendment was convened by a European Council decision of 17 June 2010 (OJ 2010, L 160/5) which 
refers, in its recital 4, to the European Parliament’s consent on the choice of not convening a Convention.
11  Source: Europolitics, 21 March 2011.
12  Draft report on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 (Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rapporteur: Andrew Duff), 2009/2134(INI) of 5 Novem-
ber 2010. Note that the title of the draft report does not indicate that Treaty amendments are also being proposed, alongside the amend-
ments of the Act on the election of the EP.
13 See the text of the amendment in the introduction of this paper.
14   See the Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2011, EUCO 10/11, pp. 13-20. The Euro Plus Pact, although ap-
proved during a European Council meeting, is therefore not a decision of the European Council but an instrument of enhanced coopera-
tion grouping the euro area countries and some, but not all, other member states of the EU. 
15  For a full treatment of those legal issues, see in particular J.V. Louis, ‘The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages’, Common Market 
Law Review (2010) 971-986; R. Smits, ‘L’Euro(pe) à l’épreuve’, Cahiers de droit européen (2010) 7-15; U. Häde, ’Die europäische 
Währungsunion in der internationalen Finanzkrise – An den Grenzen europäischer Solidarität’, Europarecht (2010) 854-866; and A. 
Viterbo & R. Cisotta, ‘La crisi della Grecia, l’attacco speculativo all’euro e le risposte dell’Unione europea’. Il Diritto dell’Unione 
Europea (2010) 961-993.
16  Council Regulation 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilization mechanism, OJ 2010, L 118/1.
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same Council session of 9 May, the ministers of the 
euro area countries, wearing their intergovernmental 
hats, adopted a Decision in which they committed 
themselves to support a separate and additional loan and 
credit mechanism.17 That mechanism, which is called 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), was 
established soon after as a so-called Special Purpose 
Vehicle - in legal terms a private company established 
in Luxembourg but jointly controlled by the euro area 
states. In terms of its lending and guarantee capacity, 
the EFSF, with a total amount of 440 billion euro, far 
outstrips the EFSM which has an EU budget guarantee 
amounting to only 60 billion euro. The operation of the 
EFSF was limited by the founders to a period of three 
years, whereas the EFSM has no fixed sunset clause, 
although its operation must be reviewed every six 
months so as to respect the exceptional character of the 
measure.   
From a legal point of view, there were two potential 
‘constitutional’ problems with the package adopted in 
May 2010. On the one hand, it is not entirely certain 
whether the intergovernmental measures taken by the 
euro countries comply with the TFEU rule that prohibits 
EU states from giving financial support to each other 
(the so-called ‘no-bailout’ rule of Article 125 TFEU). 
It can be argued that a mechanism of lending money 
subject to severe conditionality, as was put in place 
for Greece and through the EFSF, is not caught by the 
Treaty prohibition on giving (direct) financial support, 
but there are some remaining doubts. On the other 
hand, it is not entirely certain that the EU Regulation 
is within the scope of Article 122(2). In particular, it 
might be argued that Greece and Ireland were not facing 
exceptional occurrences beyond their control (as the 
text of Art 122 requires), since their governments had 
contributed to create the sovereign debt crises which 
they were facing. This latter controversy seemed to be 
the most worrying, at least from the perspective of the 
German government, since complaints had been lodged 
before the German Constitutional Court arguing that this 
Council Regulation of 11 May 2010 was an ultra vires 
action of the European Union which should be declared 
contrary to the German Constitution. Given the erratic 
record of the court in Karlsruhe, the government did 
not feel entirely confident about the outcome of those 
complaints.18 So, it is above all the controversial legal 
basis of the (comparatively small) EU law pillar of the 
financial stability regime created in May 2010 which 
prompted the member states, later in that same year, to 
envisage a treaty amendment for creating a permanent 
crisis mechanism that would replace the exceptional 
and legally uncertain EFSM and EFSF. 
Indeed, a treaty amendment could seem to solve both 
legal problems mentioned above. By inserting an 
explicit provision in the TFEU which authorizes the 
euro area member states to put in place a financial 
support mechanism for countries in budgetary and 
financial trouble, the effect of the bail-out prohibition 
of Article 125 TFEU would be neutralized by a 
complementary norm with the same treaty rank. At 
the same time, the intergovernmental nature of the 
future mechanism means that the legally ‘risky’ EU 
Regulation can be discontinued after 2013, thus cutting 
short the possible constitutional challenges before the 
German Constitutional Court or elsewhere in Europe. 
In addition, the choice for the intergovernmental route 
had the interesting consequence that the simplified 
revision procedure of Article 48 (6) could be chosen, 
as will be explained below. 
The amendment process so far
The hypothesis of a limited treaty amendment had first 
been mooted by the German chancellor Merkel in March 
2010 but had been greeted with much skepticism by the 
other EU governments who were rather horrified by the 
prospect of engaging in a new Treaty revision process 
only a few months after the Lisbon Treaty had finally 
come in operation. However, in the autumn of 2010, the 
German government managed to convince the French 
government, as emerged from a joint Franco-German 
declaration made in Deauville, on 18 October 2010, in 
which the two countries considered ‘that an amendment 
of the treaties is needed and that the President of the 
European Council should be asked to present (...) 
17  The Decision has the following baroque denomination: Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area Member 
States Meeting Within the Council of the European Union. See Council document 9614/10 of 10 May 2010, accessible on the public 
register of Council documents. There is a long standing practice of government representatives ‘switching hats’ during a Council meet-
ing and adopting decisions qua states rather than qua Council members, but this phenomenon is quite unusual in a context of enhanced 
cooperation such as this one, namely limited to the euro area countries.
18  For a discussion of the German constitutional law perspective, see D. Thym, ‘Euro-Rettungsschirm: zwischenstaatliche Rechtskonstruk-
tion und verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2011) 167-171.
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concrete options allowing the establishment of a robust 
crisis resolution framework before (...) March 2011.’19
 
At the European Council meeting of 28-29 October 
2010, some days later, general agreement was 
found on ‘the need for Member States to establish a 
permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial 
stability of the euro area as a whole’ and the President 
of the European Council was invited ‘to undertake 
consultations with the members of the European 
Council on a limited treaty change required to that 
effect, not modifying article 125 TFEU (‘no bail-out’ 
clause).’20 The last part of the sentence resulted from 
the discussions among the EU governments, and meant 
that the treaty amendment rather than deleting the no-
bail out clause would take the form of a lex specialis 
regime put alongside that clause.
Most importantly, the formulation adopted by the 
European Council expressed a preference for a crisis 
mechanism to be established by the member states of 
the euro area rather than by the European Union itself. 
This choice paved the way for the use of the simplified 
revision procedure of Art 48(6). Since the amendment 
would relate to the ‘internal policies’ part of the TFEU 
and since it would not increase the competences of 
the Union, the conditions for the use of the simplified 
procedure of Article 48(6) TEU were met. 
Following the political agreement of 28-29 October, a 
draft text of the amending Decision was prepared for 
adoption by the next European Council meeting on 16-
17 December.21 This draft Decision then formed the 
basis for the consultation of the European Parliament, 
the Commission and the European Central Bank, as 
prescribed by the text of Article 48(6).22 Although prior 
consultation of the national parliaments is not foreseen 
by Art 48(6), the single countries are free to provide 
for it, as is the case for example in the United Kingdom 
under the EU (Amendment) Act of 2008 which was 
adopted in view of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
When examining the draft European Council decision, 
the European Parliament proposed some changes 
which aimed at inscribing a complementary role for 
the European Union institutions in the text of the new 
Article 136, in particular by stating that the principles 
and rules for the conditionality of financial assistance 
under the mechanism should be determined by an EU 
regulation adopted under co-decision.23 This, however, 
would have implied that the Treaty amendment would 
have conferred new competences on the European 
Union and, hence, the simplified revision procedure 
would no longer have been available. The European 
Council, at its March 2011 meeting, decided not 
to modify a word of the draft decision which it had 
adopted in December 2010 and not to mention the EU 
institutions at all, but instead the European Council 
adopted ‘further particulars’ relating to the future 
ESM24 which provide for a close involvement of the 
Commission in the ESM’s eventual operation. The 
Commission would be called to act once again (as in 
the current Greek and EFSF regimes) as an ‘agent’ of 
an intergovernmental cooperation system.  
The amendment decision must now be approved by the 27 
member states, even though the stability mechanism itself 
will be operated by the euro area states only. Article 48 
TEU does not specify how this ‘approval’ must be given 
and, as argued above, the internal procedures leading to 
such an approval may look very similar to those needed 
for the ratification of a traditional European treaty 
amendment. In particular, it is not excluded that states 
organize a popular referendum on the matter, although the 
‘simplified revision’ rhetoric will certainly be employed 
by the governments to minimize the constitutional 
importance of the change and to reject possible demands 
for a referendum. If all member states can indeed avoid 
19  See P.M. Kaczynski and P. ó Broin, From Lisbon to Deauville: Practicalities of the Lisbon Treaty Revision(s), CEPS Policy Brief 
no.216, October 2010.
20 Conclusions of the European Council of 28-29 October 2010, EUCO 25/10, p.2.
21 Conclusions of the European Council of 16-17 December 2010, EUCO 30/10, Annex 1.
22  Consultation of the Commission and the EP is required in all cases of recourse to the procedure of Art 48(6). Consultation of the ECB 
is required by Art 48(6) only ‘in the case of institutional changes in the monetary area.’ One may wonder whether this amendment is 
situated ‘in the monetary area’ but the ECB was anyway consulted.
23  For the text of the amendments proposed by the EP, see the annex to the Resolution of the European Parliament of 23 March 2011, 
Amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose cur-
rency is the euro.
24   Those further particulars are called the ‘Term sheet on the ESM’ and are published in Annex II of the European Council Conclusions 
of 24-25 March 2011.
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the organization of a referendum, and assuming there is 
no change of heart which would lead a member state to 
refuse its approval of an amendment which was adopted 
unanimously by the European Council, it is well possible 
indeed that the amendment will enter into force on 1 
January 2013. One important reason why the considerable 
rigidity which characterizes even the simplified 
procedures, in particular through the single country veto, 
may be overcome in this case is that countries such as 
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden will not be 
part of the ESM and therefore have no particular reason 
to object to this Treaty amendment. If all goes well, the 
new European Stability Mechanism will then enter into 
operation on 1 July 2013, and replace the ad hoc crisis 
instruments which were put in place in 2010.  In legal 
terms, the ESM will be established by a treaty among 
the euro-area Member states as an intergovernmental 
organization under public international law with its seat 
in Luxembourg.25 Once again, international law is being 
used as a tool for the development of the European 
integration process. The implication of this is that the 
future operation of the ESM will not be subject to the 
normal constraints of the EU legal order, as regards 
for example decision-making procedures, subsidiarity 
control and judicial review.
25  Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2011, p.22.
